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S'I1A'rEMEN'T OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals an Order by the trial 
judge vacating a Judgment and re-opening the hearing 
for furtlwr testimony prior to entry of modified Find-
ings and final Judgment. Plaintiff-Appellant appeals on 
hrn grnnnds: 1 ) The trial court has no power to reverse 
it~elf or to modify its decision after entry of Findings 
of F'act, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on a Motion 
for a mm: trial; and 2) The trial court was in error, if 
it had snch power, in reversing or modifying its Judg-
rn en t. 
1 
DTSPOSITION IN THE Lff\VER COURT 
The disposition is stated substantially in plaintiff-
appellant's Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the decision of the lower 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents, owners of certain real propc>rty lo-
cated at 2910-2912 Sonth Second \Vest, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, held out to various builders and contractors in the 
area the offer to permit them to build structures for 
lease on the said property, provided any of them found 
tenants who, under lease, were willing to occupy the 
structures erected for them. 
Quality Construction Company, by and through its 
president, Franz Stangl, presented to respondent two 
offers of lease wherein on<>, the plaintiff-appellant here-
in, a plumber, would agrt>e to occupy under lpase om~ 
of the structures to be built to his specifications under 
terms where his services, as plumbing subcontractor on 
both structures were to be applied as payment of the 
first six months and the last six months of a five-year 
period lease. A value equivalent to $:3,000.00 of 
rent paid was established between the parties. Mr. Stangl, 
as a go between, ultimately procured thl' signatures 
of parties to the leases and the signature of respondents 
to a building eontract specifying the construction of a 
building designed to appellant's s1wcifications. The lease 
between appellant and respondents stated appellant was 
to have occupancy by October 1, 1964. 
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APlwllant as snhcontractor in construction, actually 
1wrfornwd tlw first work of laying sewer pipes prior 
to the• ponring of a concrete floor after October 1 and 
' did almost tlH' last "·ork on the building, namely the in-
stallation of fixturPs. Appellant contributed somewhat 
to the dPlay in the course of construction by withholding 
dr•cisiom; affrcting the construction to his desires and 
m·c·ds. During the lWriod required for the construction, 
ap1wllant eithPr leased or purchased other quarters, but 
Mver notified either .Mr. Stangl or respondents of such 
lPaSP or of any intent on his part to terminate either the 
1Pas0 or his participation as a subcontractor in the struc-
ture being built to his specifications. 
To the contrary, appellant continued to occupy his 
original premises to a date subsequent to his refusal to 
occupy the premises prepared for him on the Doctorman 
property. 
lfr did not inform respondents of his intention not 
to oceupy the premises until respondents made him a 
tPml<T of possession when the building was completed. 
At that tinw, plaintiff-appellant, informed respondents, 
for the first time, of his intention not to occupy the 
premises, and instituted suit for the $3,000.00 specified 
in tlw leasP. Tlwreafter, after amendment of appellant's 
Complaint, trial was held and Judgment was granted 
nppdlant for the n•asonable value of his services. 
Respondents, having filed their motion for a new 
trial, after hearing, the trial Court took the action of 




THE TRIAL COURT DID 1'\0T ERR IN VACATING THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED BY IT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
It is with sonw chagrin that n•spond<>nts' attorney 
notes his failun, to stat<' thP S}H'cifics of contend<>d error 
to be grounds for a 1w\\· trial 1md(•r Huie 5!J(a) ((i & 7), 
of the etah Rules of Ci,·il Proc('dtu·r, th(•s<' !wing: 
(6) Insnfficirnc:· of thl· <'viclrne<' to justif.'· tlw \T('l'-
dict or other decision, or that it is against la\\·. 
(7) l~rror in law. 
If the Motion as snlm1itt<•d is ddretin, the tiinr to 
protest is long sine(' goiw. Tht'I"l' is po\n•r in the Court 
to grant a new trial or ,·acak .Judg11wnt on its o\\·n 
initiative if tll<' interests of jnstic<' could so best he serv-
ed, regardless of tlu· maim<'r h.'· which tlw PITor 1s 
brought to tlw Court's a tt<•n tion-R 11IC' ;)9 (cl). 
Respondent has no quarn•l with tlw law as eitPd 
by aPiwllant, in Uptown Appliane<' & Hadio Co., Ine. Ys. 
Flint et al., 1:22 Utah 2!JS, 249 P.:2d 8:2G; and Tangaro 
Ys. Marrero, 13 U.:2d 290, :37:~ P.2d :390. 
In the Uptown Applianc<' & Radio ea~w, whid1 cl(·alt 
primarily with th<' ii,;sue of new trials, the Court dPcl<Ht>rl 
at Pag<" 302: 
"It lS axiomatic in this Stat<> that the d<'-
cision of the trial judg<> in rPfrrenee to tlw grnnt. 
ing or r<,fusing of motions for nC'W trials is a 
discretionary matter, JH'ovided then• is not an 
abuse of discretion and th<>re is reason to helieH 
that a miscarriage of justice would result if re-
fusrd." 
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'1'he Tangaro easp does no more essentially than 
eonfirrn the l-vtown A1lpliance case where it declares 
in hPad note Xo. 2 at page 291: 
'"Trial conrt has no discretion to grant new 
trial absent showing of one of grounds specified 
in rule. Hules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59." 
In the instant matter, the Court on a motion for a 
n<'W trial appar<'ntly detennined that sufficient testi-
mony had lwen taken on plaintiff's case to base a judg-
rn<>nt; hut that tlw decision made and the Judgment en-
tPr<>d thereon \\·ere in P1Tor; that there was no need for 
an rntir<•l)· new trial hnt simply a re-opening of the 
matt<•r for kstimony to be taken on defendants' Counter-
claim. 
The Court apparently felt that the Findings as made, 
alld to the extent that they were made, were correct; and 
that only additional Findings would be required to sup-
port a new Judgment, essentially in favor of the defen-
da n b-n•sponden ts. 
It was already a matter of evidence taken to the 
(•f frct that plaintiff-appellant had given no notice of 
lm aclt or intent to terminate because of it. Further, 
tlHT<· \nu; snfficient evidence b<1fore the Court to the 
1·lfrd that plaintiff-ap1wllant continued to work for and 
c1 lH'linlf of tlw proj<•ct from which it sought to gain re-
m1t1wrntion to tlw ddriment of respondents. 
F'or this r<'ason, all that was required of the Court 
\\as to ord<'r the Jndgment vacated so that the same be 
of no ]ll'<•jnclice to tlw party respondents, and order fur-
tlil'l' tc:::t"mony to he tak<·n on repondents' Counterclaim 
5 
and the alljndiration of the 0quiti<'s of tlw parties against 
each other to the end that final .Jnd.L,1111ent may be achiev-
ed. 
Rule 59 (a) of the etah Rnles of CiYil ProcPdurr 
adequatel~-, succinctly, and iwrtinPntly d<'als with thP 
power of the court to act as it was lwre; suhjPct, ho"·ever, 
to the requirenwnts as s<'t forth in tlH· rptown Appliance 
and the Tangaro cast>s: 
'' ( 1) Grounds. Subject to the prons10ns of 
Rn le 61, a new trial ma~- lw granted to all or any 
of the parties on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following cansps; pr01:irled, 710u:e1:er, that 
on a motion for a 11eu- trial in au action tried 
without a jury, the court may OJJrn thr .fudgment 
if one has been c11tered, take additional testimony, 
amend fi11dings of fact and co11clusio11s o/ law, 
make new findings and conclusions and direct t71e 
entry of a new judgment:" 
In any case, the objection by the appellant to the 
action of the Court in its difference from the specifir 
wording of Rule 59 (a, 1) is essentially an exercise m 
semantics. The Rules declares: 
" ... the Court may open the Judgment if one 
has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ... " 
The Court ?;acatrd the Judgnwnt rather than openrd 
the Judgment, and for this diffor<:>nce the app<:>llant cri<:>s 
prejudicial error. 
Appellant, on Page 12 of his Brief, insists that he 
has found no casl' when• a trial Court r<"wrs<:>d its J udg-
ment without making new Findings of Fact or Conclu-
G 
s10ns of Law, or without having vacated the Judgment 
and having taken additional testimony upon which to 
mah new Findings and .Judgment. 
H<>spon<lents contend that this has not been done in 
tlw instant case. At this point, there has been no reversal 
of .Judgm<"nt; only a vacating of the Judgment with the 
dPelared intention of the Court to take further testimony 
upon which additional Findings and a amended Judg-
ment are to be based. 
App0llant critieizes the action of the Court in sit-
ting as a conrt of appeals "·ith respect to its own action. 
Rf'spondents call attention to compiler's notes in the 
Code of Civil Procednrf' under Rule 60( e) entitled Mo-
tion to Alter or Amend .Judgment on Page 661 Volume 
9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"This Rule had no counterpart in the former 
Civil Code. The Rule was added to the Fed. Rules 
as a result of the case of Boaz v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 149 F. 2d 321 where it was contended 
that after the entry of its decision the trial court 
had no way of correcting it. 
"This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 59 ( e)." 
\Yitl10nt snch a rule or pmver in the Court to re-
nr:-;(• ibwlf wlwre, in its wisdom, it saw fit to do so, the 
lahorions and tedious procedure of appeal in each case 
\rnnld lw required. 
POINT II 
WHERE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS IS REQUIRED 
EITHER IN SUPPORT OR IN ATTACK OF A JUDGMENT, 
THE~ THE PARTY ATTACKING SUCH JUDGMENT HAS 
THE BURDEN OF BRINGING THE TRANSCRIPT OF EVI-
DENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. 
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E0!'sentiall)· th0 support or n•j0ction of the> act of 
the trial court to d1'ten11irn• it-.; 11ltirnat1• pown to n·-
VPrR<' ib jndgmPnt in acc·m"<lane<' \\·ith tlw standards 
set in thP cited l'ptmn1 Apphtn<'<' and Tangaro c·as<'s 
will require an 1·xamination of t]1p transeript as a 1d10h". 
'Vithout the transeript, th<' Snprrn1e Conrt mrnld 
have no more than the stakmenb of facts in appellant's 
and r0spondents' BriPfs from which to judge. 
Bennett Leasing Company Ys. Da\'id ,J. Ellison et 
al, 15 U. 2d; 387 P.:2cl :2-±G is a cas(· wh<'rt' ap1wllant 
attacked a judgment on tlH· grounds that thP p1·idenc·p 
does not snpport thP findings. The rtah SnprPlll(' Comt 
on Page 7-± ch•clared: 
" ... 'Ylwn the amwllant attacks the judg-
ment on the grnuncl that thP e1·idl'nce doPs not 
support the findings, lll' has th<> burden of bring-
ing a transcript of the p1·iclmcL' acldnct>d at tlH· 
trial to tl1is court so the 11writ of his conkntioll 
can he ascertairn•cl. 1']ip reeorcl brought to this 
court consists onl:-· of the eomt fill' containing 
the usual various pleadings, motions, ord<>rs, find-
ings, and judgment; ... " 
Responcl<"nts, howp1·1·r, \\·hil<· ealling att<•ntion to 
this clPf Pct in appellant's app0al, 1rnnkl not opposP tlw 
action of the Snpre111e ( 'ourt on thv suhstanti\·c i~:,;lw 
raised h~- aprwllant's Point Il. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF BREACHED ITS LEASE WITH DEFENDANTS. 
Point 1, lrn·;ing denlt \\·ith tl1<• in:iat(' po1\·<·r in t!H· 
Court to act, Point Jl I is corn·pnwd \\'itli 1d11'th<'r or ll(Jt, 
s 
granting s11el1 power, the Conrt was correct in its de-
cision to n•verse ihwlf and find for defendants-respon-
dents herein. 
Dd'endants han~ no substantial quarrel with ap-
Ji<'llant 's reeital in support of Point II except that respon-
<l(•nts find little of it related to the issue appellant pre-
S(·nts. Hesriondents accept for the purposes of this appeal 
tltc' Conrt's finding of the breach of the Lease Agree-
nwnt and that the said breach ·was material. Further, 
n·s1Jomlents do not quPstion any statement of law sub-
mitted h~· aIJ}H'llant but contend that none is germane 
to the specific issue raised by the act and decision of 
the Court in its self renrsal. 
The issue specifically is resolved as follows: 
Assumt> the contract to be of a continuing nature 
(a lPase of 5 ~·ears clnration). Assume a party to a con-
tract is g-nilty of a breach of the contract. Assume fur-
tlu·r tlw breach to be sufficiently substantial to warrant a 
t(•nnination hy the injured party. 
lT]l(l<'r thPse accepted facts, can the injured party 
ahrnp:att> that contract or rescind it without giving timely, 
unequivocal notice of his intent to rescind or terminate: 
('an h(• fnrtlwr 1iroceed in such manner from which the 
).n·ac·hing- party may reasonably assume that the injured 
i '~uty i11t(•11ds to kPep in force and effect the contract 
h(•t \\'('<'n the partiPs: reserving to himself the right to 
gin notice of a rescission at his mvn convenience without 
n·,":anl to cl('tri1m•nt to the breaching party? Respondents 
tliink not. 
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The law is fairly statc>d when it dcclan's the in-
jured party to a contract has an Plection at the time of 
the breach of contract, and for a r!:'asonable tinw there-
after, within which to waive the breach for purposes of 
termination, and to continue with the contrad, seeking 
reparations in damages for s11ch damage as was caused 
it by the breach; or in the alternatiw, to rescind the con-
tract by giving notice to the defaulting party of its in-
tent to do so. This notice must be timely, clear unequin>-
cal in meaning, but must not necessarily be in writing. It 
may be by act; it may be oral; it may he by action in-
consistent with the purposes of the contract; it may be 
by filing an Action in Rescission. 
Thereafter, much of th<' law which plaintiff cites 
in his Brief may apply. However, none of the cases cited 
by the plaintiff deal directly with what defendants con-
sider the pertinent issue here, namt>ly; ·what notice, if 
any, and what need of notice, if any, was gin•n hy the 
aggrieved party to the defaulting varty of its intent and 
when was it given~ 
In each of the cases cited, an aggrieved party has 
dedared to a breaching party in sustance; "You arc 
breaching your contract; perform or else," and there-
after suit resulted on failure of the breaching party to 
correct his breach. 
In N akdimen vs. Baker ( C.A. 8 Ark.) 111 F 2d 778; 
the defendant's agn•errn•nt was to sell and N akdinwn's 
agreement was to buy 200 shares of stock at a stipulated 
price payable by an installment Promissory Note over a 
period of time, with certain assignments as security for 
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payment of the note. On default in payment, Baker im-
llwdiatt>ly started snit for damages \Vhich were the stip-
nlatPd vrice of the contract and prevailed. However, im-
111Pdia t<'l~· after suit was instituted, Nakdirnen recon-
sid<'n'd and offered the note and securities which were 
refmwd by Baker. N" akdimen alleged this tender as a 
d('frnse. It \ms in this context that the Court held a 
party "·110 breaches cannot insist on specific performance 
finee the filing of the action was a clear termination 
of tlH' contract. 
In Bnekrnan vs. Hill Military Academy, 190 Or. 194, 
22:1 P.:2d 172; plaintiff sued on a note, security for which 
was a tract of land. The terms on which the security was 
lH•ld Jn·ovided that plaintiff would release a subdivided 
lot with each $350.00 paid. Plaintiff refused to release in 
aecorclance with this agreement after a demand by the 
drfrndant-payor. rpon such refusal, defendant failed to 
make any further payment. It was held in this case that 
tiiPl"l' "·as a termination as a clear confrontation clearly 
<1cli1wating the breach on the part of the plaintiff. 
In Dalton vs. Mullins (Ky.) 293 S:W. 2d 470; there 
was also a direct confrontation between the parties. In 
this ease the Court declared "\Yhen Dalton refused to 
wrt'onn the contract as written, Mullins had the right 
fo tn·at this action as a hrt>ach, to abandon the contract, 
to dqm rt from further lwrformance on his part, and 
finally, (kmand damages." 
In Loudt>nhack Fertilizer Co. vs. Tennessee Phos-
phate Co. ( C.A.6) 121 F. 298; and in Lynch vs. Mc-
Donald, 12 Ftah 2d 427, 3G7 P.2d 464; the tenor is es-
sentially the sanw. 
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rr'he same is true in th<• Yazoo & ::\I. Yalh·,\· R Co. 
vs. Searles, 85 l\li:::;s. 5:20, i17 So. 9i39. In this cmw, suit 
resulted from a direct eonfrontation wh<>rt>in S<>arlP;, 
required of the railroad that it switch cars to a privatP 
siding. The railroad did so until St>arll:'s refus<'d to pay 
switching and demurrage elrnrgt•s. 'l'hPreafter, the rail-
road rf>fosed to makP S]ll'cial s1\·i tching for Searles des-
pite demands that they do so. 1'his breach resulted in a 
law suit, and again the princi1ml was affirnwd that notice 
of some kind before tE•nnination is n•quire<l after breach. 
In 011r instant case, thf'n• was nothing in the natme 
of confrontation. Both partiC's conceded that the,\· had 
never met face to fac<·, or had an,\· cmn-ersation about 
this contract until after construction was completC'd, and 
defendants demanded of plaintiff that he take possession. 
On the contrary, en•ry act of the plaintiff was con-
sistent with compliance and conformity with thf> con-
siderations of the contract by him to lw performed, giv-
ing not notice of his disaffection to the defendants. 
Plaintiff cites 17 Am .• J m. 2d, and particularly SPes. 
365, 425, 512 et seq. Respondents, through tlwir attorney, 
haye no recourse hut to appron~ lwartily of the state-
ments thPrein made, and to ohservf> that if tlic•y W<'l'e 
not good law, they would prohahl,\· have not lwPn maclu 
part of the text. Hm\·<,ver, the sections eikd are not 
germane to tlw princirial, crncial issrn• which the re-
spondents pres«nt here. \Ye particularly reftc•r to 17 Am. 
Jnr. 2d; Contrnets, S<>cs. 508-509-510, whieh deal witl1 
the issne lwre pnsent<•d. 
The first srntence of See. 508, P. 988 of Contracts 
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declares, in s11l1stance, where one of the parties has not 
pnfornwd, and is not ready and able to perform his 
part of the agn~ernent on the day fixed, the adverse 
part)· 11ia.\· consi<l<>r it at an end. 
Section 509, Pg 990 declares in the first three sen-
tencPs: 
"Tlte failure of a party to perform his part 
of a contract does not per se rescind it; the other 
part)· must manifest his intention to rescind. If 
the int<'ntion is rnanifested bv a notice must be 
clear and unambiguous, conveying an unquestion-
able purpose to insist on the cancellation. A for-
mal or written notice is not necessary, however, 
although the law requires, on the part of him who 
would rescind, some positive act which shows 
snch an intention. 
"If a party means to rescind a contract be-
cause of the failure of the other party to perform 
it, he should give a clear notice of his intention 
to do so unles8 the contract itself dispenses with 
;-.;uch notice or unless notice becomes unnecessary 
hy rea8on of the conduct of the parties. Hennessy 
v. Bat:on, 137 rs 78, 3-± L. ed 605, 11 S Ct 17." 
The first sentence of Sec. 510 states: 
"nlanv cases have held that a right to re-
scind, ab{ogate, or cancel a contract must be 
<·xercised promptly on discovery of the facts 
from ~which it arises, and that it may be waived 
Jiy unreasonable delay or by continuing to treat 
tl.ie contract as a subsisting obligation." 
In Fanington v. Granite State F'ire Ins. Co., et al, 120 
l'tah }()~): :2:3:2 Pac. (:.2) 73-! the plaintiff sued insurance 
company for co111pemmtion for fire damage. Defendant, 
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insurance company, refused payment, alleging recission. 
A pertinent fact was the acceptance of an unpaid balance 
of the annual premium b,\' defendants after the event of 
loss. The Court declared on P. 119: 
"One who claims a right to recission must 
act with reasonable promptness, and if after such 
knowledge, he does any substantial act which 
recognizes the contract as in force, such as the 
acceptance of more than half of the premium 
would be, such an act would usually constitute a 
waiver of his right to rescind." 
9 A.L.R. 993 deals with the subject of the waiver 
of the right to rescind for delay. 
The trial court in its decision makes reference to 
Cox vs. Berry, 19 U (2)d 352, 431 P2d 575. In this case 
the court, while not spdling out specific estoppel, makes 
a holding entirely consistent with the equitable doctrine 
to the effect that one who is to receive the benefits of 
an agreement must bear its responsibilities. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that appellant and r<'spondents have 
little if anything to quarrel about in appellant's Brief. 
Appellant admirably supports his contention that after 
substantial breach, an aggrieved party may institute ac-
tion for termination in one of two various forms or af-
firm a contract and seek for recovery of damages result-
ing from the breach. 
None may quarrel with such a statement of the law. 
However, respondents' view is that there is a requisite 
to successful suit and that is notice of breach to the 
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party breaching. There seems no question that institu-
tion of snit could he such a notice of breach since it 
crrtainly is an action which would apprize a breaching 
part~· of his dereliction, provided that such a suit is 
brought timely under circumstances where its delay 
would not in essence constitute a waiver of the right 
to act on the breach or an estoppel to so act under cir-
cumstances where the delay can result only in gains to 
tlw aggrievrd party and added detriment to the party 
\\'ho has breached. 
The appellant here having never by word or deed 
given notice of any kind to respondents of his intentions 
not to pursue the lease; and on the other hand, having 
proceedPd to perform fully in terms of its contsruction 
tommitments on the building being built specifically for 
him and even making decisions of a unilateral nature with 
I'<'S!Jl'd to lmrtition placements among other details, has 
tertainly waived any rights to proceed after breach if 
any hy the rE'spondents or is estopped from contending 
for such a breach. 
There should be :r,io doubt of appellant's right to be 
granted the reasonable value of his plumbing services 
which the Court has found him nor is there any lesser 
doubt that respondents, being deluded to the tremendous 
loss of the entire construction cost of this building should 
Le ('ntitl('d to recover the lease stipulated rentals as con-
tracted for between the parties. 
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It \\'US for the }llll'l)OSe of Pstahlishing th<• dollar 
figurf' of such recovery against app<'llant that the Comt 
prop<•rly <'Xt>rcisL•d its fnnrtion to n•op<·n th<• .J11dgrn<'11t 
and take fnrtlwr tt>stimony. 
Respeetfnll~· snlnnitted, 
Bernard L. Rose 
1() 
